$USD
$MILLION
Every output below derives live from C = α*·E·σ·S·p with α* = 0.05, E = 0.83, σ = 0.61, S = 1B fixed. Type any price — the math, charts, and floor status follow.
Protocol health — ℋ = attack cost / value at risk
2.41
HEALTHY — CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR ℋ ≥ 2.00
Attack cost — C
—
Cost to corrupt a decryption quorum at the assumed price
Value at risk — Vsh
—
What a captured quorum could reach — the FHE tier only; the ZK pool is immune
Corruption cost — derivation, live
C = α* · E · σ · S · p
α* — CAPTURE STAKE
0.05
§14.5 repriced in v0.9.33 — was 0.60
E — ELIGIBILITY RATIO
0.83
eligible / bonded (30-epoch median)
σ — BONDED RATIO
0.61
target corridor 0.55–0.65
S · p — STAKE VALUE
—
1B supply × your assumed price
Validator economics — at your assumed price
SELF-BOND — Bmin
—
100,000 CELAR minimum (0.01% of supply) — recoverable stake, 21-day unbonding
HARDWARE — CAPEX (SUGGESTED)
$8K–12K
32-core CPU · 128 GB RAM · 2× NVMe · 10 Gbps · HSM/TEE for share containment (optional GPU for coproc duty)
OPERATIONS — PER YEAR
$6K–9K
hosting, bandwidth, monitoring, key-ceremony ops — KMS heartbeat ≥ 95% required
TOTAL FIRST-YEAR SETUP
—
bond + hardware + year-1 ops (bond is ~all of it at higher prices — and it remains your asset)
YEAR-1 STAKING REWARD ON BOND
—
≈ 11.7% nominal APR on 100,000 CELAR (≈ 4.7% real + KMS fees)
OPS BREAK-EVEN PRICE
—
price above which bond rewards alone cover annual operations (mid-range ops)
COMMITTEE PRESENCE AT Bmin
~1 in 60
draws — lottery-like KMS fee income at minimum stake; delegation (self ≥ 5%) scales seats & rewards up to 20×
Hardware and ops figures are planning suggestions pending M2 benchmarks — the spec sizes final requirements there. Consensus-only validators carry no FHE evaluation load (coprocessors are a separate bonded role).
Attack cost vs. value at risk
USD, simulated 30 epochs at your assumption — the gap is the security margin
Attack cost CValue at risk Vsh
ℋ over time
Simulated 30 epochs — dashed line is the constitutional floor ℋ = 2.00
ℋFloor ℋ = 2.00
KMS committee — 50 seats · threshold 12 · run and verified, not yet deployed
LIVE SEATS 48 / 50
HEARTBEAT (30-EPOCH) 99.2%
NEXT RESHARING 11h 24m
Committee state is protocol-side — it does not vary with your price assumption. Proactive refresh is implemented and validated; seat rotation is designed but deferred.
Capture bound — a curve, not a single guarantee · rolling 10-year window
P[CAPTURE] ≤ 10⁻⁴
α ≲ 0.034
of the 30-epoch-median eligible set
FAILS IN EXPECTATION
α ≈ 0.26
threshold is 13 of 50 — 26% of the committee
EVERY CONFIGURATION CAPTURED
α = 0.55
a 55% adversary holds 27.5 seats in expectation
RE-DERIVATION
ANNUAL
mandatory on any change to c, t, term, E
The bound is a lifetime tail over the staggered committee lottery — price changes what capture costs (C above), never how probable it is. Published as a curve because at this configuration no single (α, ceiling) pair is both true and constitutional. This curve models a committee whose seats rotate; on-chain rotation is specified and not yet built, so it describes the configuration as designed rather than a property of the running system.
Security events — simulated at the verified configuration, not a live feed
E-0 ✓ Epoch resharing complete — 50/50 shares refreshed, pkG invariant
E-1 ✓ ℋ re-computed on schedule (Vsh and C republished with derivation)
E-1 ◆ Heartbeat miss: seat #37 (1 epoch) — eviction at 2 consecutive
E-2 ✓ Eligibility ratio E published: 0.83 (30-epoch median 0.82)
E-3 ✓ Preprocessing inventory: 100% of re-encryption quota met