The key that never exists
Who can decrypt on Celar? Only a threshold quorum of committee seats, acting together. The key is born distributed, and we publish what a colluding coalition could do.
A number you can check
Every chain says it's secure. Celar publishes ℋ = attack cost / value at risk ≥ 2 — a constitutional floor, with every input published and recomputable.
Privacy claims you can check
PF-1 is an open privacy label — which data a protocol hides, from which adversaries, under which assumptions, and what still leaks. Making privacy claims comparable and falsifiable.
Prove vs. compute: what ZK and FHE can actually hide
Zero-knowledge proves facts about data you hold; FHE computes on data no single party can read. Why a confidential chain needs both: FHE for state, and, by design, stealth addresses for recipients and a v2 ZK pool for anonymity that survives full collusion.
Introducing Celar
The confidential smart-contract Layer 1: a chain that computes on data no single party can read: threshold FHE, with stealth addresses and a ZK shielded pool by design, and a security metric you can falsify.